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L’Anno del Nostro Signore mille sette cento quaranta tre was not 
a good year. The dreadful plague had broken out in the city of Messina, 
a short distance across the sea in nearby Sicily. It also happened to be 
one of the coldest winters on record to hit the Maltese islands in the 
course of the eighteenth century.1
For the Hospitaller knights and their Maltese subjects this 
deadly combination of factors did not augur well for both the Island’s 
commerce and for the safety of its inhabitants. The Hospitaller Order 
of St. John was never one to take the news of such deadly outbreaks 
lightly. Indeed, the Knights’ sanitary departments had always prided 
themselves on the rigour of their well-proven quarantine laws which 
had served them well over the centuries and had preserved the Island, 
their Convent and their subject population from many such calamities. 
Now, once again, the whole machinery was set in motion. But in 
this instance, given the close proximity of the source of the contagion 
and the many maritime, commercial, and social contacts which the 
Maltese had with the city of Messina, the risks were deemed even 
higher. The situation demanded even more careful vigilance not the 
least because of the ferocity of the outbreak. As a matter of fact, the 
outbreak of plague at Messina in 1743 would prove to be exceptionally 
1   The following year, 1744, was also noted for its ‘lunghe pioggie dell’inverno’.
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devastating in its fatality. The prominent and flourishing Sicilian city, 
for its part, was taken unawares largely because it had been spared 
from pestilential outbreaks for more than a century. The last epidemic 
that had occurred there was in 1624 but on this occasion a vessel from 
Corfu had somehow managed to evade the sanitary barriers and by 
the time that the pestilence had run its course, it would destroy some 
50,000 persons, nearly two-thirds of Messina’s inhabitants.2 According 
to the Order’s own records, the plague was believed to have originated 
in Alexandria ‘da dove l’ha imbarcato bastimento Inglese’ which then 
took it to Smirna and ‘nell’Isole dell’Arcipelago’ (where it was reported 
that it was devastating the population at the rate of 150 people a day), 
and, from there, found its way to Sicily.3
The first rumours about the outbreak of a suspicious contagious 
illness at Messina began to reach Malta by the end of April, about a 
month after the first occurrences took place at the end of the previous 
month. The direct connection between Messina and Malta would have 
ensured that the Order would have been among the first locations 
outside Sicily to receive the grave news. By the first of May, the freshly 
elected Grand Master Manoel Pinto de Fonseca  and his council felt the 
need to issue a decree to pre-empt any disorders.4 This bando prohibited 
foreign vessels entering the Grand Harbour from making contact with 
2   Popular Science Monthly, volume 57.djvu/600https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/
Page:Popular_ Science_Monthly_Volume_57.djvu/600.
3    For an account of the outbreak of plague in Messina in 1743 see Orazio Turriano 
 Memoria istorica del contagio della città di Messina dell’anno 1743 ... con 
l’istruzione, che si osservò nello spurgo praticatosi nella medesima città, che servirà 
di continuazione al supplemento della storia di Sicilia aggiunta ai principj della 
storia del signor abate Langlet (Naples. 1745), as well a shorter commentaries in 
Paolo Assalini, George Pinckard, Observations on the Disease Called the Plague, on 
the Dysentery, the Ophthalmy of Egypt, and on the Means of Prevention: With Some 
Remarks on the Yellow Fever of Cadiz, and the Description and Plan of an Hospital 
for the Reception of Patients Affected with Epidemic and Contagious Diseases (T. & 
F. Swords, printers to the Faculty of Physic of Columbia college, 1806) xxxiii-xlii; 
Samuel Latham Mitchell, Edward Miller, E. Bliss and E. White,Medical Repository 
of Original Essays and Intelligence Relative to Physic, Surgery, Chemistry, and 
Natural History, Volume 8 (1805), 225.
4   P. Cassar, ‘Sanitary Organization in Malta in 1743’, The St. Luke Hospital Gazette 
192, (Malta, 1966), 57
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other craft before being examined by health inspectors and banned 
local fishing boats from venturing beyond a twenty-mile limit from the 
shores of Malta and Gozo.  The Grand Master also appointed a special 
high-powered commission of Knights-grand crosses, endowed with all 
the necessary authority, to see that all necessary measures were pushed 
through.  These four commissioners, Fra Ottavuio de Gallean, president 
of the Order’s treasury, Fra Pitero  Rovero di Guarena, Admiral of the 
Navy, Fra D. Giuseppe Pixiotto, Chancellor and Fra Filippo Gugliemo 
Count of Nesselroad, Prior of Germany, lost no time in drawing up the 
necessary emergency measures and saw to their enforcement. Their first 
act was to recall back to Malta the galley squadron that had left Grand 
Harbour the previous day bound for Sicily and to order the vessels to 
avoiding any contact with the Italian mainland.5
The first of the Commission’s Istruzioni (written instructions) 
were issued on the same day, 29 May, the very same day that the Order 
received official confirmation of the plague in Messina.  Amongst 
these were instructions ‘per l’Isola e Spiagge di Malta’ and for Gozo. 
5   Ibid., 58.
Figure 1. General schematic plan of the city of Messina, in Sicily, as it stood 
in 1677.
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Included in these provisions were orders to arm three naval vessels 
(‘speronare’)  each under the command of a Knight, two of which were 
to be stationed in the Grand Harbour and the other ‘nei Freghi’;
‘… E giunta la note questo del porte vanno l’una verso 
ponente, e l’altra verso levante; talmente che incontrandosi 
quelli di ponente con quella stabilita nei freghi alla meta’ 
dell’isola facendosi riconoscere l’una all’altra ritornino ogni 
una per suo camino in dietro, osservando se le torri rispondono 
al segnale, che avranno dato le speronare per darne avviso 
all’Emza. Sua in caso che non rispondono, e non stasero colla 
vigilanza dovuta.
Quella poi destinata per la Parte di Levante dovra 
arrivare sin a Marsascirocco e puigliando le sue misure di 
consumare tutta la note tra l’andare e venire invigilando alla 
custodia di tutta quella spiaggia’.
Other directives, issued on 10 June, dealt with the organization 
of the Corpi di Guardia of the Barriera del Gran Porto,6 the Lazzaretto 
and Marsamxett, and Corradino, as well as the regulations for the 
Felucca detailed for guard duty at the mouth of the Grand Harbour. The 
Commissari della Sanità were furthermore issued with a ‘Regolamento 
per questo nostro general Porto e per quello di Marsamuscetto per 
li Bastimenti provenienti dalla Sicilia’. Ships laden with cargos of 
‘comestibili, o altre merci che non soffrono contumacia’ were to be 
allowed ‘lo scarico nel modo e luogo’ assigned to them while those 
‘carichi di bestiami’ were to be taken to Marsamxett Harbour and to 
proceed according to instructions given to them. By June, however, 
only ships from Calabria and the Regno di Napoli were to be accorded 
‘l’ingresso e la pratica’ while those which had ‘toccato in Sicilia’ or 
had departed ‘da luoghi suspetti’ were to be boarded and inspected by 
6   Istruzioni Per il Corpo di Guardia distinato alla Barriera del Grand Porto (10 June 
1743) – this comprised ‘8 uomini compreso il Caporale’, and a Knight, who took 
charge of the post ‘doppo cena’ and retired ‘alle ore sei della mattina circa’ when he 
was relieved by the ‘Guardiano del Porto, o Scrivano della Sanità.’
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an official who was then himself, together with the vessel, its crew and 
cargo, quarantined for 24 days.  Ships arriving from Catania, Palermo, 
and Messina ‘e suoi contorni’, on the other hand, were to be denied 
entry and sent away ‘senza nessun ricevere ne lasciar scaricare loro 
mercanzie d’alcune specie’.
Figure 2. Minute in the Order’s records outlining the regulations to be adopted 
in the surveillance of the coastal areas in relation to ships arriving from Sicily, 
dated 29 May 1743. Courtesy of the National Library of Malta.
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Cordon Sanitaire
Ensuring that the pestilence did not set foot on the island of Malta 
called for other measures apart from the requital quarantine provisions. 
Foremost amongst these, was the need to establish a cordon sanitaire 
– a defensive ring which allowed the Knights both to keep a strict and 
careful watch over every inch of shoreline bordering their little realm 
and also to intercept any attempts which sought to disregard the ‘safety’ 
barrier laid around its shores. 
Inevitably, the system of coastal watch towers and militia guard 
posts which had been set up to guard against approaching enemy 
galleys and corsair vessels was immediately recruited as part of the line 
of coastal pickets. Yet, it was soon realized that these handful of towers 
and militia posts alone were not going to be enough to hermetically 
seal off all the vulnerable landing places. For although comprising a 
land mass of little more than 316 km (121 sq miles), in practice Malta’s 
long and easily accessible shore line spanned some 136 km in length, 
making the task of controlling every single bay, inlet, and hundreds of 
possible landings places a considerably more  difficult task than it may 
have seemed a prima vista.
To begin with, the Knights had serious concerns about the 
efficacy of the coastal guards stationed in the towers. Such was their 
concern that the Order commissioned Notary Vittorio Gixti to inspect 
all the towers and report on their state of readiness and repair. 
His account makes for very interesting reading and reveals the 
overall state of abjection in many of the old De Redin and Lascaris 
watch towers, some of which were already more than a century old. It 
also reveals the squalid living arrangements and conditions of the small 
detachments of coastal guards - the capomastri  and bombardiers - who 
were permanently stationed in these distant outposts. 
In one instance, for example, we learn that the men at Għajn 
Ħadid Tower were reduced to cooking their meals in the shaft of the 
tower’s spiral staircase;
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‘… Si servono di cucina nella scala lumaca, quindi questa si 
vede imbrunita, siccome pure la camera per cagione di fumo, lo 
che pregiudica non poco alla Torre’.
Many other towers lacked windows and door furniture or leaked 
water from their vaulted ceilings in rainy weather. Practically all the 
towers were badly in need of maintenance, above all the quintessential 
riboccatura, the re-pointing of the intrices between the stone courses 
on the exterior walls of the structures, which ensured the water did not 
seep into the heart of the walls and cause all sorts of structural damage, 
not to mention the resulting dampness inside the already bleak living 
quarters within the towers. 
More importantly, however, was the realization that the system 
of about thirty or so coastal towers, although well-placed to keep a 
360-degree lookout against approaching enemy vessels, could not be 
used to enforce an island-wide picket line. True, the Knights also had 
scores of other coastal defences in the forms of batteries and redoubts 
placed closer down by the shore, many of which had only just been built 
a  couple of decades earlier, and, indeed, these too were automatically 
recruited into the quarantine provisions.7 But even so, this still left many 
other significant areas of shoreline which could not be directly controlled 
to intercept any landings, especially under the cover of darkness. To 
begin with, the network of batteries and redoubts was largely confined 
to the areas within the bays and coves, leaving the headlands  and other 
accessible places outside the confines of these anchorages unmonitored 
while the watch towers themselves, on the other hand, were, for their 
most part, placed on high ground and a considerable distance inland 
from the shoreline. In short, there remained many other places that 
simply had to guarded if the Knights truly wanted to seal off the island: 
‘ Che le Calanche principali di quest Isola di Malta dove 
possono sbarcare tali Bastimenti siano custodite con quante 
7   For a comprehensive inventory of Hospitaller coastal batteries and redoubts see 
S.C.Spiteri, Fortresses of the Cross, 505-38 and 539.
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persone stimera’ l’ Eminenza sua e che i Turcopoli vadano ogni 
notte facendo diligentemente la Ronda per tutte le marine coll’ 
obligo di dare l’avviso al Cav[aliere] più vicino quante volte si 
accorgeressero di Bastimento che sta per approdare in quelle’.
The Coastal Watch
As in the past, the problem of guarding such places was often 
solved by stationing small detachments of guards wherever these were 
needed. Ever since the middle ages, the Maltese had made use of a 
system of open-air posts placed strategically around the shores of the 
island.  After the Order of St John took over Malta in 1530, the Knights 
continued to rely heavily for the defence of the island on this local 
militia set-up which they incorporated into their own defensive system. 
This set-up consisted of two main elements, the Maħras, a coastal 
watch, and the Dejma, a sort of standing militia army. The organization 
of the coastal guard dated back to at least the late fourteenth century, 
when the Royal Camerarius, Philippus de Marino, was entrusted by the 
king with the organization of a watch for the whole island in 1375, and 
as shown by the militia lists of 1419-20, this came to include all the 
men of Malta between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five (except for the 
clergy who were exempted), who were obliged to keep watch one night 
a week according to an established roster.  
The men were deployed in three-men groups at strategic points 
around the coastline at night and, in a few sensitive places, even by day, 
the men being sent to the coastal posts nearest to their villages as was 
practicable. Thus the  men in the district of Naxxar, for example, which 
had the largest area and stretch of coastline to patrol, were deployed in 
such a way that the inhabitants of Raħal Dragu, Raħal Presa, and Raħal 
Dimaġ were sent to Lippija, those of Raħal Calleja and Mosta to Għajn 
Tuffieħa, those from the village of Naxxar, Raħal Għargħur, to Għajn 
Rasul, St. Paul’s Bay, Burmarrad (Naxxar & Lija) and those of Raħal 
Sammut (together with some men from Ħal Pessa, Lija, Raħal Attard, 
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Raħal Balzan, and Birkirkara) at Bir il-Baħar (Għallis).
When Grand Masters Lascaris and Martin De Redin built their 
coastal towers in the middle of seventeenth century, the Knights still 
had a network of  ‘sessanta Guardie in circa più e in ciascheduna delle 
quali fanno la guardia quattro uomini, che ogni notte sono due cento 
quaranta; questi sono i più poveri e i più miserabli di detta Isola’.8 A 
list and map of the location of these posts is given by Stanley Fiorini in 
his seminal paper on the Maħras and Dejma posts.
Not all these posts, it seems, were out in the open for some had 
small refuge places in the form of unfortified capanne (rural buildings) 
or other sentry rooms ‘all’anticha’, as Mederico Blondel calls them.9 
A number of these sentry rooms were still in use during the eighteenth 
century and some of these even find their way into contemporary plans 
and documentation. A plan of the Marsaxlokk defences at Bengħisa 
Point and  Wied ix-Xoqqa, for instance, dated 23 February 1761, shows 
one such militia sentry room at  Posto Rasgilian, a short distance away 
from Bengħisa Battery and entrenchments but further out along the 
shore closer to the sea and a nearby fougasse. A Pianta topografica 
del territorio di selmun appartenente al sacro Monte della  redenzione 
degli schiavi fatta nell’anno 1789, likewise, shows a Camera di guardia 
north of Mistra Battery. Other so-called ‘Dejma posts’ are often cited, 
such as the Ta’ Tabibu farmhouse in St. Paul’s Bay. Still, a number of 
militia posts seem to have lacked any shelter whatsoever.
Therefore, in a winter which was proving to be one of the 
coldest on record (‘L’eccessivo freddo che si fece sentire in quell’ 
anno’), stationing men out in the open was no solution. Something had 
to be done to protect the sentinels from the cold wind and rains. The 
answer, it appears, was to build a host of easily transportable sentry 
boxes (termed guardiole or guerites) and to deploy these wherever a 
permanent sentry was required to be stationed:
8   NLM, Arch. 110, f. 31.
9   NLM, Arch. 6551, f. 104, ‘...non ritrovandosi in tutta quella Costa di Scirocco e 
mezzogiorno, altro che due piccole guardie all’anticha, senza corrispondenza 
nessuna e con pochissimo effetto’.
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‘... Sovra venendo l’inverno si penso di dare i mezzi accioche 
li guardiani delle antiche piccolo Torri dell’Università della 
Notabile e Valletta potessero attendere al loro dovere malgrado 
l’accessivo freddo.’
Francesco Marandon, the Order’s resident military engineer, 
tells us that these ‘guardiole, in Francese Guerites, per mettere a 
coperto le sentinelle’  were constructed of  ‘tela incerata coll’ ossatura 
di legno’. He then goes on to give a detailed description;
‘Queste guardiole avevano per base due legni grossi tre oncie e 
longhi dodici palmi, nel mezzo de sud.o legni era fatta l’ossatura 
quadra di tre palmi in quadro la quale sosteneva il tetto inclinato 
da inanti a dietro, sicche essendo attorniata e coperta di tela o 
lana incerata mettera la sentinella a ridosso della pioggia, del 
freddo e del vento; Per impedire ch’ il vento non roversciasse 
si poneva una grossa pietra dietro ed inanti sulle sud.ti legni 
o stanghe ed allorche il vento veniva imboccare la portella la 
sentinella agevolmente girava la guardiola abbracciando li due 
capi delle due stanghe’.
In short, each sentry box was constructed from a wooden 
framework of three-inch thick strips of wood, had a sloping roof, and 
was covered in oiled canvas or woollen cloth, and was built to rest on 
two long sleeper poles in the manner shown in the diagram below.  The 
whole contraption was light enough to be manhandled by the sentry 
on duty so that it could be easily turned against the direction of the 
prevailing wind. But because of this very lightness, each sentry box 
needed to be weighted down with stone boulders so as to prevent it 
from being toppled over or blown away by strong gusts of wind. Such 
guardiole portabili were sent to Punta Lembi, Punta Dragut, Madliena 
Redoubt (Baħar ic-Cagħaq), and St. Thomas Tower amongst others. 
In actual fact, the use of wooden guerites in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Malta was then already a very common practice that 
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has largely gone unnoticed. Although we are nowadays more familiar 
with the domed stone-built echaugettes, some of these had actually 
begun their life as ephemeral wooden boxes before they were eventually 
replaced and rebuilt in stone. One well documented example is Fort 
Manoel, which has been shown by the present author to have lacked 
stone echaugettes when it was first built and completed in the years 
1723-1736. The Manoel Foundation documents record the use of a 
number of wooden guerites throughout the first decades of the fort’s 
life,  and one of its  wooden sentry boxes was also sent to equip the Qala 
Lembi battery built as an outpost of Fort Manoel on the seaward side of 
the Sliema headland, across the harbour.10
The problem of protecting the sentinels on lookout duty, 
however, was not confined solely to the open air stations. Even some 
10   Stephen C. Spiteri, Fort Manoel,  Arx Occasional Papers 4, 2015.
Figure 3. Author’s graphic simulation of the mobile canvas-covered wooden 
guardiole manufactured purposely for the emergency of 1743, based on 
Francesco Marandon’s description (see text). 
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of the towers and batteries themselves, though not all, required such 
added protection. A number of the then-existing military structures, we 
are told, required some added provisions to ensure that their sentries did 
not freeze out in the cold whilst undertaking their lookout duties.  As a 
result, a number of the existing defensive works were either supplied 
with temporary wooden guerites (as in the case of St. Thomas Tower) 
or else had new sentry boxes built permanently in stone.  Wied iż-
Żurrieq Tower still retains a sentry box built in stone but most have 
lost this feature. One can, nonetheless, get a glimpse of such elements 
in the plan of the Ramla Redoubt and a lithograph of Wignacout Tower 
at St. Paul’s Bay (this appears to have already been fitted to the tower 
before 1743).
The Order of St John was also obliged to repair existing militia 
posts (built in stone) and build others in stone in new locations.  These, 
too, seem to have been supplied with sentry boxes although it is not clear 
if the guardiole mentioned in this instance were of tela incerata or else 
built entirely in stone. Given that Mondion specifically mentions the 
latter only in particular instances, it may be assumed that the guardioli 
otherwise mentioned were constructed of stone.
In all, Marandon’s list gives a total of 93 watch posts and coastal 
fortifications which had been established to form part of the coastal 
picket line in 1743, amongst which were,
20 newly established militia posts supplied with guardiole  
        (fixed / portable); later in a 1745 letter, Marandon 
     mentions only 19 posts;
15 repaired or rebuilt old militia posts (either in stone or    
                supplied with sentry boxes);
17 towers of which 6 were given sentry boxes;
19  batteries of which 4 were given sentry boxes; and
16  redoubts of which 3 were given sentry boxes.
This list does not include the provisions, if any, which may have 
been undertaken for the protection of Gozo’s coastline. Still this should 
not be taken to read that no provisions were implemented to protect the 
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sister island, given its similar predicament, although it is difficult to 
explain why Marandon would have chosen to omit to mention such efforts.
Apart from the creation of new militia posts and the erection of 
guardiole, the Knights implemented various other measures likewise 
intended to improve the existing defences. Amongst these was the 
building of various ponti di pietra in order to provide access into a 
number of redoubts and batteries which seem to have lacked adequate 
drawbridges or other means of spanning their ditches. A number of 
batteries, nevertheless, still lacked drawbridges as late as  1792  when a 
decree was issued for them to be supplied with planks of wood instead. 
Some  batteries and redoubts were also fitted with banquettes. 
Marandon’s notes and list are also useful because they serve to 
reveal various interesting facts. The Mellieħa Tower, for example, is 
shown to have been employed to house a contingent of Knights from 
the ‘galliota’ which was deployed to guard the neighbouring waters. 
The passage leading down to the sea at Miġra l-Ferħa (Passo Meira 
Ferha), on the other hand, was sealed off with a wall as was a similar 
path way leading down to Fomm ir-Rrih, which had been built on 
the site of a collapsed Lascaris watch tower at Della Capra (Blat il-
Mogħza). Other details shed light on the state of what are still rather 
obscure defences. The entry for Tombrell for example, shows that the 
battery had still not been built by 1743. The document also provides 
a terminus post quem for the present blockhouses and redan at Mistra 
Battery which still lacked any form of roofed structures during the 
1743 emergency, reaffirming the present author’s earlier observation 
that this battery, begun in 1714, had been originally built simply as a 
prepared gun platform until it was fitted with landward defences during 
Grand Master Pinto’s reign, possibly a couple of decades later during 
the mobilization efforts of 1761.
Francesco Marandon’s full account of measures undertaken in 
1743, reads as follows:
‘... Si fabricano il posto Napolon presso Ricasoli
Si aggiunse una guardiola all’antico posto Preina
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Si inalzo di alcune filate l’antico posto Zennae
Si fece una divisione con muro alla camera della Torre della 
Grazia ò sià Scia ajra per separare il cavaliere dalla gente del 
presidio
Si fabrica più vicino al mare, l’antico posto Blatabaida
Guardiola alla Torre Migieles
Si fabbrica il nuovo posto Preposito con guardiola e il nuovo 
posto Siege’
Guardiola alla Torre Zoncol
Si fece il ponte di pietra alla Ridotta Vuied el aajn (Wied il-
Għajn) e se li aggiunse la gardiola all’angolo saliente
Guardiola di tela incerata a San Tommaso
Si fece il ponte di pietra alla batteria Maxel a sinistra di Cala 
S. Tommaso
Il medessimo alla Batteria Ricama a destra di Cala S. Tommasso
Si fece il nuovo posto Monsciar con guardiola
Guardiola a torre Scirop el again
Nuovo posto Cali e guardiola
Terrazzo e li banchi all’ antico posto Tombrel
Nuovo posto Falsun  e guardiola
Guardiola Torre limara (Delimara)
Ponte di pietra e guardiola alla Batteria Vilgia (Wilġa)
Niente alla Ridotta de Fango
Niente alla Ridotta Craite Vendome
Ponte di pietra alla Batteria Cajenza
Ponte di pietra Ridotta San Giorgio
Guardiola e li banchi batteria Ghzira
Ponte di pietra Ridotta a Birzebbuga
Niente alla batteria Elminiek
Niente alla ridotta Calafrana
Il ponte alla batteria Ben isa
Niente al posto Rasgilian  (there already was a post here)
Si e messa ad uso di guardiola l’antica Santa’ Barbara della 
Torre Ben isa
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Si e fatta una volta al posto ditto Vujed el mista
Si e fabricato il nuovo posto Uied Znuber con guardiola
Niente alla Torre Wardija
Nuovo posto Kabar el Gharib con guardiola
Niente al Torre Suto, questa si rinova nel 1761 capace di cannone
Si è fabbricato di nuovo e 15 canne piu verso levanter il posto 
Rasbajadha e guardiola 
           Ras il hamrija (?)
Nuovo posto Aajn Manoel e guardiola qual posto cadde in 
rovina per esser mancato di sotto la rocca
Nuovo posto Ghar Lapsi e guardiola a fine di trasferire ivi li  
guardiani dell’ antico posto Carrub che per essere troppo dentro 
terra non serve nell’oscurita della note
Si rifabricano l’antico posto Pietra negra nel sito in cui era
Si murò solidamente il Passo Megira Ferha
Si fabbrico il nuovo posto Blat el Melk
Il posto della Capra fu fabbricato a spese dell’ Università 
dell’Notabile
Niente alla Torre Lippia
Niente alla Tore Aajn Tuffieka
Nuovo posto Hamricia
Guardiola alla Salina depiro
Qualche piccola riprazzione alla Torre Rossa Sant Agata per 
allogiare i Cavalieri offiziali della Galliota dopo essendo partite 
galere che facevano la guardia nelli freghi besogno fare detta 
guardia in terra
Si fece nuovo posto Circkewwa
Niente Batteria Ujed muza (Wied Musa)
Niente alla Rid.ta vicina del med. Nome
Niente alla  Rid.ta Grasp Bandeville
Niente alla Batteria Vandome nel mezzo de Freghi
Niente alla Ridotta Crevelli
Niente alla Rid.ta della Ramla Hosilien Spada
Niente alla Batt.a Torre Harach
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Si Taglio un passo che era nella rocca tra questa Torre e la figura (?)
Si fabbrico il nuovo posto Redum Hammar con guardiola
Si é demolita la camera destra della Batteria Fedeau de Vangien 
la terrazzo della quale in occasione del terremoto cadde con 
porione de muri
Niente al Ridotta Vandomo (Mellieħa)
Si fece ponte di pietra ed una guardiola alla batteria Westreme
Si fece nuovo posto Aain Zeituna e guardiola
Si aggiunse la guardiola alla torre Selmun
Si fabbrico il nuovo posto Selmunet in fronte al canale
Si fece un posto ò sià camera nell’antica batteria La Mistra e si 
mando una guardiola portabile
Niente alla Batteria Arrias
Niente alla Batteria Vendome
Niente alla Torre San Paolo
Ponte e banchi alla Batteria Bugibba
(gia ditto) Qawra
Niente alla ridotta sinistra delle saline
Niente alla ridotta destra delle Saline
Una guardiola alla Torre Gallis
Nuovo posta Ghadira Gallis con guardiola
Niente alla batteria Gallis
Niente Ridotta Marco
Niente Torre Marco
Si fece un piccolo riparazione alli magazeni della Batteria 
Marco
Si Mandò una guardiola portabile alla R.ta della Madalena
Si fabbrico sulla punta Saliente il posto se Kedderine che era  
           nell’ angolo rientrante e vi si aggiunse la guardiola 
(oggi capace di cannone)
Si aggiunse una guardiola all Rid.ta San Giorgio
Piccola riprazione alla Grotta sulla punta Ghemmuna per 
mettere a coperto tre omini in tempo di bonaccia
Si fece il nuovo posto San Giuliano con guardiola
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Guardiola alla Torre san Giuliano
Guardiola tal Genla
Nuovo posto Salvaloco e guardiola
Guardiola portabile all punta Lembi
Fece la guardiola della Madonna
Guardiola portabile alla Punta Dragut.’
Guarding the Harbours
The Order’s great concern for the need to control the island’s 
distant shores was equally matched by its concern for ensuring a tighter 
grip over all the quarantine areas established within the two main 
harbours themselves. Controlling the large volume of naval traffic 
reaching the harbour necessitated the  enforcement of various measures 
aimed at ensuring both an adherence to standing regulations as well 
as the establishment of additional quarantine areas set aside for the 
berthing of foreign vessels.  
The most sensitive quarantine area was Marsamxett Harbour 
which housed the Lazzaretto or quarantine hospital that had been 
established on the Isolotto way back in the mid-seventeenth century 
by Grand Master Lascaris and now also housed Grand Master Antonio 
Manoel de Vilhena’s newly built fort.  Such was the importance of 
this station that specific detailed instructions were issued to regulate 
the various maritime and quarantine activities around the shores of 
this harbour. These Istruzzioni per il Corpo di Guardia destinati per la 
Custodia del Lazzaretto, issued on 10 June, reveal that this particular 
guard was to comprise a detachment of twenty soldiers, a sergeant and 
two corporals under the command of a Knight, ‘divisi in due differenti 
corpi di guardia contigui al ditto Lazzaretto’, whose duty was to guard 
against any unauthorized activity on both land and sea.  The first of these 
was established on the southern part of the Isolotto, facing Valletta, and 
was to comprise a knight, a sergeant, a corporal and twelve soldiers. 
This detachment was obliged to ‘fornire una sentinella sul capo di 
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rocca vicina al mare detta il cannone’, another ‘alla sua dritta sulla 
ponta del Sperone’ [the spur of the glacis] and a third  ‘sul secondo 
sperone’.
The second corpo di guardia, on the other hand, comprising a 
detachment of eight men was to take control of the area ‘all estremita 
del Lazzaretto presso la Capella’ as well as the area of the quarantine 
hospital ‘sul bordo di mare’. The garrison of the nearby Fort Manoel was 
also expected to contribute to the quarantine provisions by providing 
two sentries to be likewise stationed ‘sopra li due speroni che sono tra 
le due corpi di guardia’.11
The regulations also stipulated that the Knight in charge of these 
two locations was to be allowed to retire to the city every day ‘per pranzo 
e cena’. The commissioners of Health, for their part, were stationed just 
across the harbour opposite the Isolotto, ‘sotto la loggia’, a building 
which stood on the quay just outside the Marsamxett Gateway leading 
into the city. This administrative station was also expected to ‘arborare 
un piccolo standardo’ for signalling purposes.
Corradino
Equally important was the Corpo di Guardia established for 
Corradino. This station was set up to control all the quarantined ships 
laying at anchor ‘nel Porto dietro l’Isola’ (now known as Dockyard 
Creek) which was set aside as an anchorage for foreign vessels. For this 
purpose a wooden barrier was erected in the middle of the creek  and the 
area divided in such a way as to isolate the ‘Bastimenti d’Italia, Francia 
e Spagnia con patente netta’ from  those ships with a ‘patente sospetta’ 
and ‘patente brutta’ (see manuscript plan). This barrier was constructed 
from ships’ masts bound together with iron chains (‘Antenne legate con 
forti catene di ferro’), similar to the Venetian porporella, to which was 
attached a ‘pontone di guardia’ (floating guard post).
11   Fort Manoel has four speroni, or spurs of the glacis, two serving the re-entrant 
places-of-arms and the other two, the salient place-of-arms along the land front.
194 Stephen C. Spiteri
Figure 4. Manuscript plan attached with the folder containing the various 
1743 regolamenti, showing  the berthing arrangements in the Senglea creek set 
aside for the quarantine of foreign vessels arriving from suspected locations. 
The location of the Corradino ‘Corpo di guardia’ with its courtyard-type of 
enclosure is shown enclosed by the white box. Image courtesy of the National 
Library of Malta.
The troop assigned to this station consisted of a sergeant, two 
corporals and eighteen soldiers and these were stationed in a large 
building located at the mouth of the creek, below the Corradino heights 
and close to the location where ‘pietre e savorra’ (ship ballast) were 
ordinarily deposited. This building itself, or better still, the walled 
compound, is shown in a manuscript plan entitled ‘Tipo dimostrativo 
de bastimenti in quarentena nel Porto dietro l’Isola’. It is drawn as 
a rectangular enclosure with a singular room - a courtyard type of 
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Figures 5 and 6. The Corpo di Guardia building at Wied Qirda, limits of 
Żebbuġ, with Author’s graphic reconstruction (top) showing the courtyard 
arrangement with its chemin-de-ronde and merlons.
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guardhouse configuration which, as a matter of fact, is very similar 
to a still-existing building that was likewise used for guard duties in 
the eighteenth century as a form of guardia casalis on the outskirts of 
the village of Żebbuġ at Wied Qirda - this small compound is situated 
next to the small church (or chapel as it is often called) dedicated to 
The Visitation Of Our Lady To St. Elizabeth.12  This church was itself 
grafted onto an older and obscure watch tower equipped with box 
machilocation (hence its name as Torri tal-Misħun) which seems to date 
from the sixteenth century. This militia corpo di guardia is enclosed 
by a high wall fitted with a narrow sentry walk or walkway (chemin-
de-ronde), musketry loopholes, and merlons, while its main entrance, 
and façade front the country lane leading out of the village. Another 
interesting feature, undeniably linked its role as a sentry post, is the pair 
of stone flag-pole holders crowning the highest room of the building. 
These would have been used for signalling purposes.
The Corradino corpo di guardia, judging by the plan, was not 
located at sea level because the drawing shows the building fronted by 
a double flight of steps rising from the ‘strada delle ronde’ that ran all 
along the foot of the Corradino heights. This detachment was obliged to 
‘fornire, giorno e note tre Sentinelle; l’una su le armi alla Porta 
del Corpo di Guardia; la 2:da Alla punta del molo vicino al 
Giardino del V.do Bali Don Francesco [Giardino Menezes]; e 
la 3:a tra quella, ed il Corpo di Guardia. Alle quale sentinelle 
sarà consegnato l’ordine di non lasciar entrare, ne uscire dal 
recinto della quarantena Barca veruna grande, ò piccola, 
Scialupa, ò Caicco, si di giornio, che di note; e di non lasciarle 
ne pure avvicinarsi à Bastimenti infetti sotto qualunque motivo, 
ò pretesto, che fosse’.
12  This church attracted considerable veneration. The Conventual Chaplain and Vice 
Chancellor of the Order Fra Gian Frangisco Abela is said to have had a particular 
devotion towards this church which he used to visit frequently and also provided 
for its maintenance.  The present Baroque-style edifice, however, was re-erected in 
1675 by Cleric Bartilmew Magro and was consecrated in 1678. Magro, who was 
later murdered in the course of a robbery, was buried inside it. 
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Defensive Isolation
A closer examination of the Order’s special quarantine measures 
adopted in 1743 shows that the system of defensive quarantine adopted 
on this occasion was very much in line with the preventive system of 
cordon sanitaire - or defensive isolation – then practiced by the leading 
maritime states of Venice, Genoa and Naples, as well as by the Papal 
states.13 These precautions comprised a multi-layered defensive ring 
which was designed to guard, intercept and report upon any suspicious 
activity.  
Basically, this consisted of an outer defensive line of armed 
sailing boats (listed as ‘speronare’ in the Maltese context), a second 
line of coastal forts, towers and observation posts (including coastal 
batteries and redoubts) within visual distance of one another, an inner 
ring of foot and cavalry patrols (mounted ‘Turcopoles’ in Malta and 
Gozo), and an inner ring of quarantine (isolation) stations and controlled 
entry points inside the harbours.
This tiered hierarchical structure was designed to warn of 
incoming vessels, intercept them at sea with force if necessary and 
prevent any landed elements from proceeding inland. Each layer was 
obliged to remain in a state of vigilance and report on those elements 
that came in contact with it – the captains of the speronare, for instance, 
were expected to check and report on the tower’s sentinels and the 
Turcopoles were used to report on the alertness of the various guard 
posts. We know, thanks to Marandon’s notes, of at least one grave 
attempt, during this emergency, which was fortunately intercepted 
and this involved a contaminated Brigantine which sought to make a 
landing along the coastline somewhere in the vicinity of Żabbar. This 
episode, actually, was the cause for the erection of an number of inland 
guard posts, such as those at Corradino and perhaps that at Wied Qirda. 
13   A detailed survey of the system of cordon sanitaire as adopted throughout these 
various states can be found in Andrew D. Cliff, Matthew R. Smallman-Raynor, Peta 
M. Stevens, ‘Controlling the geographical Spread of Infectious Disease: Plague in 
Italy, 1347–1851’ in Acta med-hist Adriat 7, no. 1 (2009), 197-236.
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A large part of the system’s success, nevertheless, was also tied 
to the lines of communication which existed between the Order and the 
various states and cities with which it had direct dealings. The Order’s 
extensive network of ambassadors, ricevitori, and agents (and often 
spies) deployed throughout the main cities and ports of Europe were 
instrumental in maintaining a continuous stream of information flowing 
into the Island. Foreign governments, too, sought to apprise the Order 
directly through their representatives and were in turn briefed by the 
Grand Master. While, as shown by Paul Cassar, direct communications 
with the Senate of Messina itself seem to have been interrupted by 
June, with letters from the city council seeking assistance apparently 
failing to reach the island, the Order and its officials were relatively 
well informed of the latest developments, even though, as remarked by 
Bali de Froullay (the Order’s representative at the court of Versaille) to 
Grand Master Pinto in August that ‘les quarantaines sont causes que les 
lettres de Rome retardens’.14 
 Indeed, the official correspondence between Pinto and the 
French court continue to reveal the scars of having been imposed 
to quarantine sanctions and purification until well into the  months 
November and December.    
Certainly, the stringent measures did not come without their 
own brand of negative side effects. The heavy commercial activity with 
Sicily, for one thing, came to an abrupt halt. This immediately affected 
the importation of food supplies such that within a few weeks of the 
implementation of the enforced isolation, the local provisions of food 
began to fall to dangerously low levels and Grand Master Pinto and 
his council were soon faced with the loathsome inevitability of having 
to purchase alternative supplies from their North African neighbours.15 
The Island’s predicament was brought to the attention of the 
French King who made it known to the Grand Master, via Bail de 
Froullay, that te French Court would not object to a truce between the 
14   NLM, Arch. 1224, f.345v.
15   C. Testa, The Life and Times of Grand Master Pinto, 1743-1773, (Midsea Books,  
Malta. 1989), 97.
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Order and its Barbary adversaries as long as the contagion in Sicily 
remained for ‘Malte un malheur tres considerable’.16
Epilogue
As things turned out, the threat from Sicily abated by the end of 
that summer and the Order was spared the awkward necessity of having 
to enter into a formal truce with the Barbary states, even though, as 
already stated by Carmelo Testa, some products were actually imported 
from North Africa through foreign intermediaries’.17
More importantly, however, was the fact that the Maltese 
population had emerged from the ordeal unscathed. The Maltese islands 
were spared the devastation that had visited nearby Sicily. Whether this 
was the direct result of the stringent quarantine provisions which had 
been implemented by the Order on this occasion, or simply because 
of good fortune, it is impossible to tell. The Maltese islands would 
continue to remain plague-free for the remainder of the eighteenth 
century under Hospitaller rule and it would be only in 1813 that the 
Maltese would succumb to one of the worst epidemics ever to hit their 
island throughout the course of its early modern history. That, however, 
is another story.18
16   Testa, ibid., 97-98.
17   Testa, ibid., 98.
18   An expanded and fully illustrated version of this paper, in book form, is under  
preparation for publication in the ARX series of Occassional Papers.
200 Stephen C. Spiteri
